Demystifying Bearer Capability URIs
Historically, there has been a practice of combining URIs with access tokens containing sufficient entropy to make them difficult to brute force. A few different techniques have been implemented to do this, but those techniques can be considered implementation specific. One of the earliest and most notable uses of this technique can be observed in the Second Life backend APIs.
An example of a capability URL being used in the fediverse today would be in the way that Pleroma refers to ActivityPub objects and activities: https://socially.whimsic.al/objects/b05e883b-b66f-421b-ac46-c6018f539533
is a capability URL that allows access to a specific object.
However, while it is difficult for capability URLs to be brute forced due to containing tokens that have sufficient entropy to make guessing them expensive, they are have a serious flaw — since the access token is part of the resource being accessed, they tend to leak the access token in two ways:
- Browser
Referer
headers - Server access and error logs
Since the usage of capability URLs has become widespread, a wonderful specification has been released by the IETF: OAuth 2.0. OAuth provides a possible solution in the form of bearer tokens, which can be passed around using an Authorization
header.
Bearer Capability URIs (aka bearcaps) are essentially a construct which combines a resource with an access token that happens to grant some form of access to that resource, while keeping that access token out of band. Since the access token is out of band, it cannot be leaked in a Referer
header or in a server log.
But what does a bearcap URI look like? It’s actually quite simple. Let’s build on the example URL I gave above — it’s bearcap
URI would be something like: bearcap:?u=https://socially.whimsic.al/notice/9nnmWVszgTY13FduAS&t=b05e883b-b66f-421b-ac46-c6018f539533
.
Let’s break this down into parts.
bearcap
is the name of the URI scheme, and then that is further broken down into a pair of URI query parameters:
u
is the URI that the supplied token happens to be able to access in some wayt
is the access token itself
In this case, a client which wanted to consume this bearcap (say to fetch the object behind it) would make a GET
request to the URI specified, with the token specified:
GET /notice/9nnmWVszgTY13FduAS HTTP/1.1
Host: socially.whimsic.al
Authorization: Bearer b05e883b-b66f-421b-ac46-c6018f539533
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
[...]
In a future post, we will go into how bearcap URIs can help to bring some aspects of capability-based security to ActivityPub.